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An Analysis of Income Differentials by Marital Status
 Regina Madalozzo
Resumo
O casamento não oficializado, coabitação, tem se tornado cada vez mais freqüente nas últimas décadas. 
O objetivo deste trabalho é examinar a relação entre os salários das mulheres casadas e das solteiras ou 
coabitantes. A literatura a este respeito mostra que, enquanto o prêmio financeiro para o casamento é 
verificado em diversos estudos e países quando o objeto de estudo são os homens, o resultado para mulheres 
não é conclusivo. A principal inovação do presente estudo é a existência de controles para seleção, tanto 
na escolha em participar da força de trabalho como de alterar seu estado civil. Regressões “switching” e 
decomposição de Oaxaca mostram a existência de uma penalização financeira para mulheres casadas. 
Corrigindo para ambos os tipos de seleção, a diferença nos salários das mulheres casadas com relação às 
coabitantes varia entre 49% e 53%, favorecendo as coabitantes. Este resultado aponta para a existência 
de uma penalidade ao casamento. 
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abstRaCt
Unmarried cohabitation has become a more frequently observed phenomenon over the last three decades, 
and not only in the United States. The objective of this work is to examine income differentials between 
married women and those who remain single or cohabitate. The empirical literature shows that, while 
the marriage premium is verified in different studies for men, the result for women is not conclusive. The 
main innovation of my study is the existence of controls for selection. In this study, we have two sources 
of selectivity: into the labor force and into a marital status category. The switching regressions and the 
Oaxaca decomposition results demonstrate the existence of a significant penalty for marriage. Correcting 
for both types of selection, the difference in wages varies between 49% and 53%, when married women 
are compared with cohabiting ones, and favors non-married women. This result points to the existence 
of a marriage penalty. 
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Unmarried cohabitation has become a more frequently observed phenomenon over 
the last three decades, and not only in the United States. Recent legal changes in 
some countries give cohabitators the same legal standing as married couples.1 In 
some countries, cohabitors sign affidavits, which stipulate that the union becomes a 
legal marriage after a pre-determined length of time.2 In the United States, limita-
tions on welfare receipt provide incentives for cohabitation as compared to marriage, 
because welfare benefits can be lost upon getting married. However, it is not only 
to escape from restrictive welfare rules that more people are choosing not to marry. 
Many young, well-educated persons opt to live together without being married. These 
persons are the so-called cohabitors.3 There was an increase in cohabitation in the 
United States over the last 20 years. The percentage of opposite sex couples cohabiting 
doubled from 1980 to 1999.4
The objective of this work is to examine income differentials between married women 
and those who remain single or cohabitate. The empirical literature shows that, while 
the marriage premium is verified in different studies for men,5 the result for women is 
not conclusive. Because marriage has a strong connection with children, and women 
usually are the parent responsible for taking care of children, most studies consider 
children’s impact on female wages. The earnings variation among women can fluctu-
ate with the number of children (MooRe; WIlSon, 1982) or with marital status 
(HIll, 1979). Concerning the number of children, women’s wages present an in-
creasing family status penalty in the 1980s if accounted for by the presence of children 
(Waldfogel, 1997). However, for those women who do not give up working at 
childbirth, there is no wage gap when compared to childless females (JoSHI; PaCI; 
Waldfogel, 1999).
The main innovation of my study is the existence of controls for selection.6 Selection 
can occur when inclusion in a sample and presence of the variable of interest are both 
determined by the same unobservable factors. not accounting for this problem causes 
1 for instance, in Brazil, since the late 1990s, any couple living together for more than one year has the 
same rights and obligations to each other as they would have if they were legally married (Brazilian 
law Code number 9278, May, 10th. 1996).
2 In Kenya, for instance, it is possible to avoid the costs of marriage, which are not only the expenses 
of the ceremony but also the bride wealth that is still common, using this maneuver. See Kabeberi-
Macharia and nyamu (1998).
3 The cohabitation trend is the subject of research across sociology, demography, and economics. for ex-
amples, see Brien, lillard and Waite (1999), Bumpass and Sweet (1989), Carlson and danziger (1999), 
lillard, Brien and Waite (1995), Willis and Michael (1994) and Waite (1995).
4 See US Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov or the volumes of Statistical abstracts of United States 
cited at the references.
5 See allegretto and arthur (1999) and Korenman and neumark (1991).
6 Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) examine the differences in wage structure for females and control for 
selection into the labor force using Heckman’s (1979) procedure. However, adequate controls for the 
selection problem is not the main point of their paper; neither is the interpretation of effects of chil-
dren on mothers’ wages. This happens because they cannot properly estimate the wage equation in the 
absence of important explanatory variables, such as experience and employee characteristics.  
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serious bias in an analysis.7 In this study, we have two sources of selectivity: into the 
labor force and into a marital status category. Women seem to have more flexibility 
in choosing to work, relative to men. The first selection control aims to solve this 
bias in the analysis. The second selection problem is the difference among women 
who make distinct choices about living arrangements, i.e., marrying, cohabiting, or 
remaining single.
This study supplements the literature on income differentials among cohabiting, sin-
gle and married women by making use of the switching regressions as well the oaxaca 
(1973)/ Kuhn (1987) decomposition method, as applied in Billger (2000). The swi-
tching regressions and the oaxaca decomposition results demonstrate the existence of 
a significant penalty for marriage. When correcting only for selection into the labor 
market, the wage gap between married and cohabiting women favors married wo-
men. The predicted marriage premium is roughly 5%, using the switching regressions 
method. Using the same methods for the sample of single and married women, the 
marriage premium is 10%. However, this result is biased because it does not account 
for selection into marital status. Correcting for both types of selection, the difference 
in wages varies between 49% and 53%, depending on the method used, when mar-
ried women are compared with cohabiting ones, and favors non-married women. This 
result points to the existence of a marriage penalty. Moreover, this marriage penalty 
can oscillate between 26% and 34% when the comparison is made between married 
and single females. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the data and presents 
a demographic analysis of the sub-samples. Section 2 contains a discussion of the 
econometric methods to be used in the study and presents the results and their inter-
pretation. Section 3 concludes and includes directions for future work.
1   Data anD DEscRIPtIvE analysIs
The data used in this paper come from the annual demographic files of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the annual demographic files for 1995, 1997, and 1999.8 
The sample utilized in this study has 81,979 observations among married, cohabiting, 
and single women between the ages of 20 and 64 over these years. 
one of the greatest advantages of using CPS data, besides its characteristic of being a 
very representative sample of the US population, is the possibility of identifying coha-
7 See more about the selection problem in Vella (1998).
8 The CPS uses the same sample for 4 consecutive months, keeping this sample out for the following 8 
months and re-interviewing them for another 4 months. This process is called rotation 4-8-4. 
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bitors.9 Since 1990, the US Census has set apart unmarried partners, i.e., cohabitors, 
from spouses or housemates. The CPS began the cohabitors’ identification in 1994.10 
However, only the head of the household’s partner is identified as a cohabitor by the 
CPS. The head of the household, or the “householder” before 1980, is the person 
who owns or rents the house unit, which presumably implies the person with higher 
income in the family.11 In order to capture the heads who are cohabitors without 
misrepresenting the results,12 it was necessary to implement another method. Using 
the household identification number, it was possible to link each husband and wife, 
as well as to connect unmarried partners as a couple, and to capture single women 
who are the family reference person.  
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the sample to be used in this study, 
classified as married, cohabiting, or single and using the CPS final weight for each 
individual. This table shows that cohabiting and single women are younger than 
married women and have fewer children.
The pattern on income data indicates that single women have higher wages and sa-
laries ($18,701), followed by cohabitors ($16,607). However, when considering only 
those women with positive income, married women on average have larger wages and 
salaries than cohabitors ($22,419 and $20,281, respectively). 
even then, single women earn 4% more than married females. Hourly wage is a cons-
tructed variable. It is calculated dividing the variable “annual wages and salaries” by 
“usual number of hours worked per week” multiplied by “number of weeks worked 
last year”.
9 The Panel Study of Income dynamics (PSId) is another dataset that distinguishes cohabitors from 
married persons. However, this distinction is made only in the first year that the unmarried partner 
entered the family. after this, the cohabitor is treated as a spouse even if the couple did not actually 
marry, i.e. it is not possible to distinguish married from unmarried couples.
10 Until this date, the way to investigate cohabitation using the CPS data was to use the method called 
PoSSlQ (Partners of the opposite Sex Sharing living Quarters). This methodology had the caveat 
of including only unmarried partners without children in the sample and, sometimes, accounting 
roommates as partners. The PoSSlQ consists in identifying all households with exactly two adults 
of opposite sex who are unrelated. The adjusted PoSSlQ allows the inclusion of children, but it still 
does not capture all cohabitors and also includes some roommates as partners (CaSPeR; CoHen, 
2000). The option of using the period after 1994 for the present study is justified by the inclusion of 
the correct sample of cohabitors.
11 If no such person exists, then any adult member, excluding roomers, boarders or paid employees can 
be characterized as the householder. If the married couple jointly owns or rents the house, then the 
householder can be either one.
12 Roughly 50% of the female cohabitors’ sample is the head of the household, as can be seen in Table 
1. Identifying the female as the head is either a peculiar characteristic of unmarried couples or means 
that, in these cases, the financial responsibilities are more equally shared between the partners.
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taBlE 1 - DEMogR aPHIcs, cPs MaRcH FIlE (1995, 1997 anD 1999) 
REstRIctED to woMEn wItH agE BEtwEEn 20 anD 64, In-
clusIvE
Married Cohabitor Single
Age 41.82(.042)
33.60
(.154)
33.80
(.106)
Annual Wages and Salaries 15,546(82.89)
16,607
(294.67)
18,701
(219.78)
Annual Wages and Salaries
(only for women with positive 
income)
22,419
(104.63)
[47,365]
20,281
(329.29)
[3,552]
23,227
(246.12)
[7,875]
Hourly Wages 18.64(.315)
16.07
(.924)
19.42
(.857)
Hourly Wages
(only for women with positive wage)
19.69
(.319)
[27,087]
16.47
(.945)
[1,873]
19.82
(.875)
[4,176]
Number of children .34(.003)
.19
(.008)
.26
(.006)
Employment (%):
     Part-time 20.61 15.50 14.48
     Full-time 53.41 68.57 67.70
     Unemployed 2.20 5.26 5.22
     Others 23.78 10.67 12.60
Education(%):
     Less than high school 11.37 14.33 14.14
     High school diploma 35.67 36.55 26.28
     Some college 18.44 23.20 21.42
     College degree 27.09 21.26 29.08
     More than college 7.43 4.66 9.08
Status in the household (%):
      Head 21.14 45.24 100
     Wife 78.86 - -
     Partner (cohabitor) - 54.76 -
Race (%):
     White 79.07 74.06 55.81
     Black 7.15 12.36 30.85
     Hispanic 9.42 10.11 9.68
     Other 4.36 3.47 3.66
# of Observations 67,887 4,335 9,757
notes: 1) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 2) number of observations in squared-brackets.
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Concerning hourly wages, single women appear to have higher wages (19.42) than co-
habiting (16.07) and married women (18.64). This pattern is maintained when obser-
ving only those women with positive income. Single women earn approximately the 
same hourly wages as married women (19.82 and 19.69, respectively), and both earn 
higher hourly wages than cohabiting women (16.47). a higher proportion of married 
women are engaged in part-time jobs (21%) than cohabiting (16%) or single women 
(15%). Cohabiting females are mostly allocated in full-time jobs (69%). Relative to 
education, a larger fraction of single women have a college degree or higher (38%) 
than married or cohabiting females (35% and 26%, respectively).
one common question in studies that compare different marital status is how to 
categorize cohabitors. do they look more like married persons or singles? While co-
habitors and single women have approximately the same work profiles, and both are 
more engaged in the labor force when compared to married women, they are very 
dissimilar concerning education, race, and hourly wages. Therefore, given these dis-
similarities, it is reasonable to analyze married versus cohabiting women and married 
versus single women separately. for the rest of the analysis, the total sample is divided 
into these two sub-samples. This division facilitates the investigation of the direct 
effect of cohabitation or singlehood on income with respect to married women.
2  tHEoREtIcal FRaMEwoRk anD EMPIRIcal REsults
The first step in this study is to analyze income differentials for women through a ba-
seline wage regression.13 In this specification, the natural logarithm of hourly wages 
(in dollars) is explained by personal characteristics of the individuals and indicators for 
being an unmarried partner or single. The basic regression has as explanatory varia-
bles: experience,14 experience-squared, number of children younger than 6 years old, 
indicators for educational attainment,15 race,16 2-digit industry, 1-digit occupation,17 
residence in a metropolitan area and yearly indicators18 to account for the structure’s 
13 an unadjusted wage regression for women, even knowing the selection problem for this sample, is 
estimated. The reason for this is that the results from this estimation will serve as a comparison with 
the results of studies that deal or do not deal with the selection problems. The difference between this 
baseline regression and the adjusted one will be presented at the end of this paper. 
14 This is a created variable: experience is the age minus the number of years of study minus six.
15 They are: less than high school, high school degree, some college, college degree, and post-college 
degree. excluded category: less than high school.
16 They are: White, Black and Hispanic. excluded category: White. notice that the category white includes 
other minorities not specified as Black or Hispanic. The ethnicity variable that allows the identification 
of Hispanics do not allow the same for other minorities. Therefore, other minorities were included with 
the Whites.
17 all the regressions were also estimated using 2-digit occupation indicators. Results for these latter 
regressions point to the same direction as the ones presented here. However, the switching regressions 
and oaxaca-Kuhn effects estimated by using 2-digit occupation indicators are abnormally higher than 
the ones estimated using 1-digit occupation indicators.
18 They are: 1995, 1997 and 1999. excluded category: 1995.
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difference over the years. for each sub-sample,19 an indicator for marital status was 
included. In the sub-sample married versus cohabitors, an indicator that assumes value 
1 if the woman is a cohabitor and zero otherwise was included. In the sub-sample 
married versus single, an indicator that assumes value 1 if the woman is single and 
zero otherwise is the alternative.
Table 2 presents the results for this baseline regression. Column (1) uses the sample 
composed of married and cohabiting women and, column (2), the sample of married 
and single women. In all the regressions, robust standard errors were estimated to 
control for heteroskedasticity, as described in White (1980). all regressions are wei-
ghted by the final CPS weight. In both regressions, the return to experience is positi-
ve with decreasing marginal returns, as is clear from the negative sign on the variable 
experience-squared. The presence of young children has a negative influence on the 
income of their mothers. Returns to education are increasing, as expected. The coe-
fficient on the indicator for Hispanics in both regressions is negative and significant. 
The coefficient for the Black indicator is not significant in both regressions.
The focus of this paper is on the impact of marital status on wages. Both the indica-
tors for being a cohabitor and for being single have no significant estimated coeffi-
cients relative to being married. These results imply similar wages for married women 
when compared to cohabitors or singles. These results are interesting and suggest 
no income differential for women in distinct marital status categories. However, 
the sample is composed of only women and an extensive literature on the selection 
problem into the labor force shows that women have a different pattern of choosing 
to work than men. Besides the discontinuous participation in the labor force caused 
by childbearing,20 it is necessary to account for the possibility that differences in 
unobserved characteristics, that will henceforth be called ability, influence female 
participation in the labor market and, consequently, the wage level.
another source of selectivity in this study is selection into marital status. given 
different characteristics, women opt to remain single, cohabit, or get married. This 
choice among different marital statuses can also reflect the sub-samples’ unobserva-
ble characteristics.  If these unobservable characteristics act both in the choice over 
marital status and the wage level, not accounting for these influences would bias the 
inference.
19  I.e., married versus cohabiting, and married versus singles.
20  Blau and ehrenberg (1997) study the female role in the labor market. goldin (1990) presents valuable 
research on the evolution and trend of female participation in the labor force.
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taBlE 2 - BasIc REgREssIons – DEPEnDEnt vaRIaBlE: ln(HouRly 
wagE)
Married and Cohabitors Married and Singles
(1) (2)
Cohabitation indicator .007(.028)
-
Indicator for singles - -.009(.021)
Experience .031***(.002)  
.031***
(.002)
Experience squared -.006***(.0001)
-.001***
(.0001)
Children < 6 -.090***(.014)
-.113***
(.014)
High school .199***(.031)
.224***
(.031)
Some college .247***(.034)
.297***
(.034)
College .455***(.035)
.502***
(.035)
Pos-college .704***(.041)
.733***
(.040)
Black .048*(.026)
-.027
(.023)
Hispanic -.074***(.027)
-.074***
(.027)
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Occupation indicators Yes Yes
Metropolitan Area Indicator Yes Yes
Year indicator Yes Yes
Constant 1.57***(.323)
1.59***
(.318)
Adjusted R-squared .17 .17
# of Observations 27,087 29,390
notes: 1) Robust standard error are in parenthesis. 2) Statistical significance by: * at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%.
The technique used to deal with selection into the labor force is based on Heckman 
(1979). for the second selectivity problem, related to the choice of marital status, the 
switching regressions technique is used, as discussed in Maddala (1986). notice that 
not accounting for these selectivity problems would result in biased estimates.  
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2.1   selection Into labor Force Participation
one way to deal with selectivity into the labor force, as noted previously, is to use the 
Heckman (1979) model. Women with different characteristics or abilities choose to 
engage or not engage in the labor force. While the presence of young children has the 
effect of increasing the cost of working, educational attainment and experience can 
have the opposite influence. Therefore, to estimate the probability of participating in 
the labor force, we use the number of children younger than 6 years old,21 indicators 
for education, and age and age-squared. Prior studies show that non-white women 
have a stronger commitment to the labor market. To account for this effect, indicators 
for race were included. Besides these intuitive variables, indicators for marital status 
were also included.22 The expected sign for both indicators is positive, given that 
the household production theory affirms that division of work is efficient when each 
member of a family dedicates their time to the more productive job.23 Men usually 
receive relatively better compensation for their time in the labor market than in home 
production. Thus, the expectation is that married women dedicate more time to home 
tasks and less to the labor market, and this would imply a different probability of 
working given the marital status choice.
Table 3 presents the results for the estimation of the probit regression, which is spe-
cified as:
1 2 3 4Pr( ) [ ]i i j j
i j
working age agesq child educ race D= Φ η + η + η + η + δ + ς + κ + ε∑ ∑          (1)
Where (.)Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution, educ accounts for the four 
indicators on education attainment, and race represents the two race indicators. D is 
the indicator for marital status, as explained before. The results are very similar for 
both samples as shown in columns (1) and (2).
21 In order to check for robustness, alternative specifications were tried, like the inclusion of number of 
children less than 18 years old. Results varied slightly in magnitude, but the conclusions remain the 
same. also checking robustness, an alternative concept of the dependent variable was used. Instead 
of using wages and salaries, the tested alternative was income from the longest job. final results remain 
basically the same. However, this latter specification is not the most sensible way to analyze a wage 
differential. Therefore, only the results from the regressions with cited specifications in the main text 
are reported.
22 different indicators were included depending on the sample composition. for instance, in the sample 
with married and cohabiting women, an indicator for cohabitors was included. In the sample of married 
and single women, an indicator for singles was included as a regressor.
23 See Becker (1973) and angrist and evans (1998).
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taBlE 3 - PRoBIt REsults FoR PRoBaBIlIty oF BEIng In tHE laBoR 
FoRcE(1)
Married and Cohabitors
(1)
Married and Singles
(2)
Cohabitation indicators .181***(.023) -
Indicator for singles - .172***(.016)
Age .090***(.003)
.086***
(.003)
Age squared -.001***(.0001)
-.001***
(.0001)
Children < 6 -.381***(.009)
-.384***
(.008)
High school .488***(.016)
.500***
(.016)
Some college .590***(.018)
.605***
(.017)
College .751***(.017)
.780***
(.017)
Pos-college 1.01***(.025)
1.04***
(.024)
Black .131***(.022)
.035*
(.019)
Hispanic -.138***(.015)
-.140***
(.015)***
Constant -1.12***(.071)
-1.03
(.068)
Pseudo R-squared .09 .10
# of observations(2) 77,913 83,845
notes: 1) Robust standard error are in parenthesis. 2) Statistical significance by: * at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. 3) The number of observations on this table may differ from the one on Table 2, since 
the latter is a weighted estimation over the sample.
as expected, age and age-squared account for the concave experience effect: the for-
mer is positive and the latter negative. Both are significant. Young children have a 
negative influence on participation in the labor force. Consistent with the expected 
positive and increasing returns to education, the higher the educational degree at-
tained, the larger the probability of working. for the sample of married women 
and cohabitors, there is a positive and significant effect of being black, implying a 
higher probability of participation into the labor force by Black women. In column 
(2), relative to the sample of married and single women, the same coefficient is not 
significant. Hispanic accounts for a lower probability of participation in the labor 
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force, and it is significant in both samples. In addition, as anticipated, the effect of 
not being married, i.e. being a cohabitor or single, on the probability of working is 
positive and significant. The correction for selection bias for participating in the labor 
force is attained by the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) as one of the regressors in the wage 
equation. The IMR is defined as:
 0
0
( / )
( / )
ZIMR
Z
′ϕ γ σ=
′Φ γ σ
 (2)
Where Z ′γ represent the regressors in the probit equation, and 0σ is the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the original equation that had the sample selection 
problem. 
Table 4 presents the results for both samples for the logarithmic wage regression 
augmented with the additional regressor (2), as shown in equation (3):
 ln( ) j j
j
wage X D IMR= b + γ + δ + ε∑   (3)
Where Xj represents the covariates as described previously,24 D is the dummy for the 
marital status, and IMR is the variable that controls for selection into the labor force. 
a note of attention must be made at this point. While on Table 2 the estimated co-
efficients indicate the marginal effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
one, the results presented in Table 4 and the following ones could not be interpreted 
in the same way. When we use the Heckman correction procedure – the inclusion 
of IMR on the regression -, the marginal effect of each individual variable on the 
dependent one must take in account the indirect effect of the IMR coefficient.25,26 
Columns (1) and (2) present the results when controlling for participation in the labor 
force by the sub-samples of married and cohabiting women or married and singles, 
respectively. notice that, in order to have an identified model, some authors suggest 
that the probit regression, equation (1), should include at least one variable that is 
not a regressor in equation (3). Therefore, from the wage regressions, the variable 
children<6 was excluded. It also makes sense to proceed with this exclusion because 
the number of children is more likely to influence participation into the labor market 
than the wage level of the mother. In addition, the variable age squared, which is not 
included in the wage regression, enters in the probit model. When included in a wage 
regression, the variable age squared or experience squared accounts for the existence of 
24 They are: experience, experience-squared, indicators for educational attainment, race, 2-digit industry, 
1-digit occupation, residence in a metropolitan area and yearly indicators.
25 More about this on Hoffmann and Kassouf (2005) and Saha et all (1997).
26 for the final calculations of the differences between married and cohabitors or single women, we use 
this indirect effect, as the reader would be able to check on Section II.
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a concavity in the wage.27 The same reasoning can be used here. The probability of 
participating in the labor force may increase with time and after some determined age 
this probability decreases. The significance of this coefficient estimative reinforces 
this interpretation. 
taBlE 4 - REgREssIon REsults oF ln(HouRly wagE), contRollED 
By MRP (woRk)
Married and Cohabitors Married and Singles
(1) (2)
Indicator for marital status -.043(.028)
-.056**
(.022)
Mills Ratio Prob(Working) -.621***(.069)
-.693***
(.069)
Experience .021***(.003)
.021***
(.002)
Experience squared -.001***(.0001)
-.001***
(.00001)
High School .062*(.035)
.064*
(.035)
Some college .090**(.039)
.113***
(.039)
College .261***(.042)
.274***
(.042)
Pos-college .464***(.050)
.454***
(.049)
Constant 2.00***(.327)
2.05***
(.323)
Adjusted R-squared .17 .18
# of observations 27,087 29,390
There are caveats for both estimated regressions in columns (1) and (2). The first is 
the negative sign on the Inverse Mills Ratio for the labor force Participation. one 
should expect that the larger the unobservable characteristics that positively influence 
the participation of women into the labor force, the greater should be the expected 
income. However, the results point in the opposite direction. for these women, selec-
tivity into the labor force exists, as the significance on the IMR coefficient indicates, 
although women who expect to be less well remunerated by their work actually are 
27 age and experience are different variables. We opt to use the experience and experience squared in 
this work. following the literature on this research area, the experience variable is a proxy for effec-
tive experience calculated by age – 6 – years of education. This procedure is widely used because most 
databases do not have the actual experience of individuals, only their age and education.
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more likely to participate in the labor force. This unexpected result is not exclusive to 
this paper. Vella (1998), using nlS data, finds the same negative sign in the IMR 
coefficient. His result also implies that selectivity into the labor force works in a re-
verse way. Women with characteristics that predict receiving lower wages are more 
likely to participate in the labor market.
one possible explanation of this odd result is that women in these samples have a 
greater need to work. It is plausible to think that a single mother has no choice but 
to work, especially if she and her children depend entirely on her labor. The Welfare 
Reform act of 1994 may have contributed to this result. By these reforms, no one 
could be a welfare recipient for more than 3 years. This change is only valid after 
1999, however we could reasonably argue that this may have had some effect on the 
preceding years by adjustment to the future implementation. In addition, the part-
ner or husband’s income could influence participation in the labor force. generally, 
unions are made in a similar income range. Therefore, poorer, less educated women 
in general would be paired with men with similar characteristics and might have no 
other choice but to work, independent of the smaller compensation for their own 
characteristics (BeCKeR, 1973).28
finally, the coefficients on the Table 2 for the central variables, cohabitating in colu-
mn (1) and single in column (2), changed substantially once we account for selection 
into labor force participation, on Table 4.29 This means that if we only correct for 
selectivity into the labor force using Heckman’s procedure,30 there is a marriage 
premium for the sample of married women compared to single ones. However, as 
discussed before, there is also selectivity in the marital status choice. The next step is 
to deal with this selectivity bias, which will be done by using the switching regressions 
approach.
2.2  selection into different family categories
In this sub-section, results correct for selection into different marital statuses. The 
dataset has no information on the background of these women (e.g., parents’ income 
and education) besides their education and race profile, but some of the more rele-
28 neal (2001) has an interesting theoretical paper reasoning that economically disadvantaged women 
may choose to remain single when an economic crisis happens. He argues that the creation of a welfare 
system may have reinforced this decision, and also may have created the opportunity for these single 
women to have children.
29 notice that the race indicators are not included on Table 4, because their estimations were not 
significant.
30 This result is reinforced when using switching regressions. Table 7 presents the results for both sub-
samples, with a significant difference between wages paid to married and to unmarried women, the 
marriage premium, when correcting only for selection into the labor force. Sub-section 2.3 presents 
these results.
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vant information that could influence the decision to get married are included in the 
empirical model.
Here it is necessary to highlight the importance of conducting this second selection 
correction. as when we estimated the wage regression correcting for the individual 
selection into the labor market in order to account for the effect of marriage status, 
we also have to correct for the individual selection into each family category. for 
instance, if the most able women choose to remain single by their own; while the less 
able choose to marry, and then not accounting of this type of selection would mis-
takenly include a kind of ability bias on the estimated coefficient of marriage status. 
The second selection correction will allow the correction for this bias and also the 
calculation of the real effect of marriage on wages.
first, by the demographics, one can conclude that age is important in this decision: 
married women are older than singles or cohabitors. The presence of younger children 
could influence this decision in either direction. on one hand, having a child may 
motivate mothers to marry because they could share the responsibilities of educating 
and sustaining their children. However, on the other hand, single mothers can lose 
part of their income when they marry. for instance, child support receipts can decre-
ase if the single mother opts to marry.31
The education profile is included to explore the differences in the composition of 
these groups. Using the demographics in Table 1, it is evident that Black women are 
more likely to stay single. In the opposite direction, Hispanic women are more likely 
to marry. The inclusion of race indicators accounts for these differences.
The variable that is included in the probability model to cohabitate or stays single, 
which is not included in the wage estimation, is the indicator for owning a house. 
Spending a considerable sum of money to buy a house can signal an inclination 
toward, or a readiness, for stability.32 as the papers that analyze male returns to 
marriage emphasize, one of the possible motives for the marriage premium could be 
that stability in one’s personal life can result in on-the-job productivity. The expected 
sign on this variable is negative for both regressions, probability of cohabiting and 
probability of staying single, implying that owning a house, as one would suspect, is 
related to being married.
31 See Hu(1999) and Veum(1992).
32 of course, buying a house also means that the person has some wealth. This fact does not contradict the 
fact that the person who buys a house is also the one who has more inclination toward stability. even 
considering a house only as a sign of wealth, like an investment, we also could think that an investment 
is a sign of stability per se. Both ways, the variable owning a house can be considered a good proxy for 
marriage.
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The probability model of cohabiting or being single can be expressed by the following 
equations, similar to equation (1):
1 2 3 4Pr( / sin ) [cohab gle age child= Φ η + η + η + η housing ]i i j j
i j
educ race+ δ + ς + ε∑ ∑     (4)
Where housing is an indicator for owning a house. Table 5 presents the results for 
these regressions. as expected, age negatively influences the probability of being a 
cohabitor or single. Having a young child has the same effect, which suggests that 
the benefits of staying single and, possibly, maintaining alternatives sources of income 
(e.g., child support or alimony) are more than compensated for by the benefits of 
sharing the responsibilities of parenthood. 
Schooling has different effects for the samples. Having more years of education im-
plies a lower probability of entering into a cohabitation union, but this has the op-
posite consequence on the probability of staying single. The higher the education 
degree, the more likely a woman will stay single. as anticipated, the indicator va-
riable for Black is positive and highly significant for probability to continue single. 
The Hispanic indicator is negative for the probability of entering into a cohabitation 
union, but smaller and positive for the probability of remaining single. owning a 
house has the intuitive sign:  it is more negative for the probability of staying sin-
gle then for cohabiting. for both regressions, the estimated coefficients are highly 
significant.
The switching regressions method, described in Madalla (1986) and applied in Billger 
(2000), uses the results from Table 5 to control for selection into family status. This 
method is both an alternative to and an adjustment of the Heckman procedure for 
the cases where more than one type of selection is involved in the regressions. It fits 
in this study in order to control for the two types of selectivity that could bias the 
final analysis.
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taBlE 5 - PRoBIt REsults FoR PRoBaBIlIty oF BEIng a coHaBItoR 
oR PRoBaBIlIty oF BEIng sInglE
Married and Cohabitors Married and Singles
(1) (2)
Age -.038***(.001)
-.030***
(.001)
Children < 6 -.555***(.019)
-.452***
(.013)
High school -.087***(.026)
-.134***
(.022)
Some college -.074***(.029)
.045*
(.023)
College -.243***(.029)
.145***
(.022)
Pos-college -.171***(.041)
.452***
(.029)
Black .147***(.029)
.904***
(.019)
Hispanic -.245***(.026)
.030
(.020)
Own a house -.558***(.017)
-1.05***
(.014)
Constant .564***(.044)
.573***
(.035)
Adjusted R-squared .15 .26
# of observations 77,913 83,845
notes: Robust standard error are in parenthesis. Statistical significance by: * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** 
at 1%.
In the switching regressions, the sub-samples are divided again, now by each marital 
status: married, cohabitors and single women. The estimation proceeds by two wage 
equations:33
 1 1ln( )cohabitors ci i
i
y wage X= = b + ε∑  (5)
 2 2ln( )married mi i
i
y wage X= = b + ε∑  (6)
33 In the text, the explanation is linked to the sample of married and cohabiting women. The same is ap-
plied to the sample of married and single women, by replacing cohabitors for singles.
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The variable yk (in this case, wage profile and k=1,2) is assumed to follow diffe-
rent probability laws for married and cohabiting women. There is also an Indicator 
function, which takes value 1 when the selected characteristic is present (in this case, 
being a cohabitor) and zero otherwise. Making use of the Heckman (1979) selectivity 
theory, we have:
 1 1 2 1( | ) ( ) / ( )E y y Z Zεε ≥ = −σ ϕ Φ   (7)
where Z are possible explanatory variables for the occurrence of the selected 
characteristic,34 which is being a cohabitor. 
as a practical matter, the estimated equations are:
 1 1 1
( ' )ln( )
( ' )cohabitor ci ii
Zy wage X
Zε
 ϕ γ= = b +σ + ε Φ γ 
∑  (8)
 2 1 2
( ' )ln( )
1 ( ' )married mi ii
Zy wage X
Zε
 ϕ γ= = b +σ + ε −Φ γ 
∑  (9)
The estimated coefficients for equations (8) and (9) will be useful in the next sub-
section. Results for these estimations are presented on Table 6 – all regressions include 
the indicators for occupation, industries, metropolitan area and year. notice that 
the two IMR are included on the regressions, so the estimated coefficients must be 
interpreted using this correction to calculate the marginal effects. In that section, the 
results are used to estimate the predicted income differentials by marital status using 
the switching regressions model and the oaxaca-Kuhn decomposition.35  
34 The other regressors are the same expressed in Table 5: age, number of children less than 6 years old, 
indicators for education and race, indicator for owning a house and a constant.
35 Tables for these estimations are available upon request.
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taBlE 6 - REsults FoR swItcHIng REgREssIons – MaRRIED anD 
coHaBItoRs – DEPEnDEnt vaRIaBlE: ln(HouRly wagE)
Married Cohabitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mills Ratio Prob(Cohabit) - - 1.08***(.151) - -
.565***
(.165)
Mills Ratio Prob(Working) - -.599***(.073)
-1.03***
(.096) -
-1.26***
(.259)
-2.42***
(.418)
Experience .034***(.002)
.020***
(.003)
-.002
(.004)
.029***
(.008)
.010
(.008)
-.030***
(.014)
Experience squared -.0006***(.0001)
-.0002***
(.0001)
.0002***
(.00001)
-.0003
(.0002)
.0003
(.0002)
-.0009***
(.0003)
High School .190***(.033)
.047
(.037)
-.092**
(.041)
.373***
(.094)
.078
(.115)
-.294*
(.166)
Some College .242***(.036)
.072*
(.042)
-.099**
(.047)
.430***
(.104)
.063
(.131)
-.418**
(.200)
College .447***(.037)
.241***
(.044)
.003
(.055)
.700***
(.109)
.250*
(.147)
-.399
(.247)
Pos-college .700***(.043)
.448***
(.053)
.175***
(.065)
.918***
(.147)
.402***
(.185)
-.321
(.280)
Black .048*(.027)
.037
(.027)
.035
(.027)
.001
(.085)
-.003
(.084)
-.003
(.084)
Hispanic -.091***(.028)
-.039
(.029)
-.043
(.029)
-.037
(.096)
.033
(.097)
.015
(.096)
Constant 1.50***(.338)
1.99***
(.339)
2.69***
(.350)
1.65***
(.166)
2.45***
(.237)
2.54***
(.239)
R-squared .16 .17 .17 .20 .21 .22
# of observations 25,214 25,214 25,214 1,873 1,873 1,873
Married Singles
Mills Ratio Prob(Single) - - .545***(.068) - -
.331***
(.063)
Mills Ratio Prob(Working) - -.589***(.073)
-.858***
(.081) -
-1.25***
(.220)
-1.72***
(.243)
Experience .034***(.002)
.021***
(.003)
.005*
(.003)
.043***
(.005)
.026***
(.006)
.006
(.007)
Experience squared -.0006***(.0001)
-.0002**
(.0001)
.0001
(.0001)
-.0008***
(.0001)
-.0002**
(.0001)
.0001
(.0001)
High School .190***(.033)
.047
(.037)
-.049
(.039)
.450***
(.092)
.108
(.104)
-.090
(.113)
Some College .242***(.036)
.071*
(.042)
-.031
(.043)
.668***
(.096)
.218*
(.115)
.004
(.124)
College .447***(.037)
.239*
(.045)
.119**
(.047)
.899***
(.098)
.351***
(.129)
.119
(.138)
Pos-college .700***(.043)
.446***
(.053)
.335***
(.055)
1.01***
(.107)
.397***
(.143)
.174
(.151)
Black .048*(.027)
.051*
(.027)
.181***
(.030)
-.201***
(.047)
-.161***
(.047)
.021
(.058)
Hispanic -.091***(.028)
-.040
(.029)
-.005
(.029)
-.132*
(.075)
-.040
(.076)
.017
(.077)
Constant 1.50***(.338)
1.98***
(.339)
2.44***
(.333)
1.26***
(.112)
2.26***
(.207)
2.12***
(.194)
R-squared .16 .17 .17 .24 .25 .25
# of observations 25,214 25,214 25,214 4,176 4,176 4,176
notes: 1) Robust standard error are in parenthesis. 2) Statistical significance by: * at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%.
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2.3 -  Predicted income differentials
In this analysis, two different methods will be applied. The first one uses the swi-
tching regressions procedure to calculate a percent wage differential, as in Billger 
(2000). The second technique is closest to the approach of Hallock, Hendricks and 
Broadbent(1998), who use an individual-based form of the oaxaca decomposition as 
introduced in Kuhn (1987).
Using the estimated parameters calculated from equations (8) and (9), it is possible to 
predict wages for cohabiting women as if they were cohabitors or married. With the 
results from there regressions, the same calculations are used to predict wages for sin-
gle women as if they were single or married. after these computations, the results are 
used to calculate the wage differentials for the different samples. The second method 
of analyzing income differentials is Kuhn’s extension of the oaxaca decomposition. 
The original work of oaxaca (1973), on discrimination against women, suggested 
that the income differential measure should be:
 
0
0
m m
f f
m
f
W W
W W
D
W
W
 
−    =
 
   
 (10)
where 



f
m
W
W
represents the observed male-female wage ratio and 
0




f
m
W
W
represents 
the male-female wage ratio without the existence of discrimination.
In order to get this measure, he suggested the use of the following regressions. Both 
male and female data, separately, would be regressed as shown in equation (11)
 ln( )i i i i
i
W X u= b +∑  (11)
where wi is the hourly wage rate for the i-th worker, Xi represents a vector of individu-
al characteristics, b is the regression’s coefficients and ui represents the error term.
Having the estimated ˆ mjb coefficients for the male sample and the estimated ˆ
f
jb for 
the female sample, we use them with the sample means, and it is possible to get the 
statistic D :
 ˆ ln( )m f fj j
j
D X W= b −∑  (12)
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where fjX represents the average of each variable that composes the vector of indivi-
dual characteristics for females, and fW the average female wage. The discrimination 
factor is the difference between the observed mean of the female wage from the wage 
that women would have if they were evaluated as men and considering the observed 
characteristics of women.
Kuhn (1987) extends this derivation. Instead of using the average of each variable that 
composes the vector of individual characteristics of the sample, he suggests using the 
individual specific measures, with two alternative measures. They are:
 
1 ˆˆ ln( )m f fi j j i
j
D X W= b −∑  (13)
 2 ˆ ˆˆ m f f fi j j j j
j j
D X X= b − b∑ ∑  (14)
1ˆ
iD measures the income differentials over the actual wage of each woman and 
2ˆ
iD
uses an estimative of the wage for each woman. The choice between these two depen-
ds on the women’s unobserved characteristics.36 neither one of these measures would 
be preferable to the other, unless there are assumptions about unobserved characte-
ristics. In the present work, I use both equations (13) and (14) to analyze the data. 
only the results from equation (14) are presented.37 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of these two methods. Table 7 presents the results 
for the switching regressions and Table 8 for the oaxaca-Kuhn’s decomposition.38 
notice that the IMR effects (on labor force participation and family categories) are 
included on these calculations.
36 Kuhn (1987) says that equation (13) is preferable when the unmeasured ability is sector-specific, and 
equation (14) is preferable when the unmeasured ability is general. 
37 Table 7 presents the average of the difference between what married women were supposed to receive if 
they were cohabitors and what they were supposed to receive being married, using the estimated param-
eters from equation (11). The average is the same for both equations (13) and (14). only the standard 
errors change. equation (14) has smaller standard errors. However, even in the results from equation 
(13),which have bigger standard errors, the predicted coefficients for the difference between married 
and cohabitors (or singles) were still significant. Their t-statistics were between 10.9 and 42.3.
38  notice that Table 8 presents the results for the oaxaca-Kuhn predicted wage differences in percents.
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taBlE 7 - wagE DIFFEREntIals usIng swItcHIng REgREssIons
PANEL A: Predicted hourly wage differentials for cohabiting women
Predicted 
Wage 
Differentials
[(2)–(3)]/(3)
Cohabiting 
Coefficients 
Mean Predicted 
Wage
Married 
Coefficients 
Mean Predicted 
Wage
Difference in 
Predicated 
Wages
t-statistic for 
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline .011 10.22 10.10 .12 4.25
Controlling for Labor Force 
Participation Selection -.052 10.31 10.87 -.56 -21.42
Controlling for both PLF and 
Marital Status Selection .528 10.85 7.10 3.75 94.03
PANEL B: Predicted hourly wage differentials for single women
Predicted 
Wage 
Differentials
[(2)–(3)]/(3)
Single 
Coefficients 
Mean Predicted 
Wage
Married 
Coefficients 
Mean Predicted 
Wage
Difference in 
Predicated 
Wages
t-statistic for 
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline -.034 10.78 11.16 -.38 -13.94
Controlling for Labor Force 
Participation Selection -.099 10.71 11.89 -1.18 -45.61
Controlling for both PLF and 
Marital Status Selection .256 10.75 8.56 2.19 98.17
taBlE 8 - oaXaca-kuHn PREDIctIons FoR coHaBItIng/sInglE 
woMEn saMPlE (PREDIctED wagE as coHaBItoR/sInglE 
– PREDIctED wagE as MaRRIED) ÷ PREDIctED wagE as 
MaRRIED
As Cohabitors As Single 
(1) (2)
Baseline .045(.004)
.032
(.003)
Controlling for Labor Force Participation Selection -.031(.004)
-.039
(.003)
Controlling for PLF and Marital Status Selection .492(.009)
.336
(.003)
note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Panel a of Table 7 presents the results for the cohabitators sample, and Panel B sho-
ws the results for the sample composed of singles. Using the baseline specification, 
cohabiting women, keeping their own characteristics, receive hourly wages 1% higher 
than if they were married. When controlling for selection into the labor force, this 
difference goes in favor of married women. The marriage premium is 5.2%. However, 
as discussed previously, the comparison between married women and cohabitors (or 
singles) should account for the selectivity in the choice of marital status. accounting 
for the second type of selectivity, cohabitors earn an income 53% higher than if they 
were married.
The results for singles are similar. Without controlling for any type of selectivity, 
i.e. using the estimated parameters from the baseline regression, single women earn 
annual wages and salaries 3.4% lower than if they were married. Controlling only 
for selectivity into the labor market, this difference is 9.9%, still in favor of married 
women. However, in the final specification, which accounts for both selectivity into 
the labor force and selectivity in the choice of marital status, shows that single women 
have incomes 25.6% higher than if they were married.
These results point to the existence of a marriage penalty for women. Ignoring both 
selectivity problems would bias the results. Correcting only for the selectivity into 
the labor force would bias them implying a marriage premium for both sub-samples. 
only the specification that accounts for both selectivity problems gives the result of 
a wage premium for non-married women between 25.6% (singles’ case) and 53% 
(cohabitors’ case).
Table 8 presents the results for the measure of income differentials developed by Kuhn 
for the two sub-samples.39 Column (1) shows the results of the predicted difference 
between what cohabiting women earn, with their own characteristics, being coha-
bitors and what they would be predicted to earn being married. Using the baseline 
specification, cohabiting women earn 4.5% more being cohabitors instead of being 
married. Controlling for the selection into the labor force, this difference flips to 3.1% 
in favor to married women. However, we should also control for the selectivity into 
marital status. Using the final specification, the difference between what cohabiting 
women would earn by being cohabitors and what they would earn if they are married 
is 49.2%, reinforcing the marriage penalty estimated by the switching regressions 
method.
Column (2) in Table 8 presents the estimated difference between what single women 
would earn by remaining single and what they would have earn if they were mar-
39 Table 8 expresses the values for the estimation of:
 [(wage as cohabitor/single) – (wage as married)]÷ wage as married
 In order to get the percents values, it is necessary to calculate the exponential value of this difference.
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ried. The baseline regression shows a difference of 3.2% between the two predictors. 
Controlling only for selection into the labor market pushes the difference to 3.9%, 
but in favor of married women. The assumed correct specification is on the last line, 
which controls for both selection problems (into the labor force and in the choice of 
marital status). This last specification predicts a difference of 33.6% between what 
single women is predicted to earn by remaining single and what they would have earn 
if they were married.
By two alternative methods, the switching regressions procedure and the oaxaca-
Kuhn decomposition, results indicate the existence of a marriage penalty for women, 
when adequately controlling for both selection problems. The magnitude of this pe-
nalty varies with the chosen procedure, however both are consistent on the direction 
of the difference, favoring cohabitors and single women.
3   conclusIon anD FutuRE DEvEloPMEnts
The main goal of this paper is to empirically investigate women’s income differen-
tials by marital status. The motivation for this relies on the fact that the marriage 
premium for males is a well-known result, but for females the existence of a penalty 
for being married or a premium for being single or cohabiting is a topic that has 
received much less attention. Using data from the CPS for 1995, 1997 and 1999, 
and controlling for two types of selectivity, using techniques as in Maddala (1986) 
and oaxaca(1973), empirical results show that married women have lower pay than 
non-married or cohabiting women. My estimates indicate a statistically significant 
income gap between married and cohabiting women in the range of 49% to 53%. 
When comparing married with single women, this difference increases. Using the 
switching regressions method, the difference is 25.6% in favor of single women. By the 
oaxaca-Kuhn decomposition, the difference of annual income between married and 
single women is 34%.
This paper shows that both selection into the labor force and in the choice of marital 
status matter. not accounting for them would seriously bias the final analysis, even 
implying a non-existent marriage premium. accounting for selection into the labor 
force is important, as other cited references indicate. However, not accounting for 
the choice of marital status would wrongly predict that income differences between 
married and cohabiting (or single) women favor the former. Controlling for both 
types of selection, we have a consistent result of the difference for each sub-sample 
and conclude that a marriage penalty exists for women. Because the income difference 
between women in distinct marital status categories has received little attention up 
to now, there are some avenues for further investigation. one of the possible future 
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developments of this research is to divide the sample by race. Because white women 
have a somewhat different profile for work than non-white women, this investigation 
could shed some light on the subject. another potential development would be a 
theoretical model for the existence of income differentials among women given their 
marital status. Marriage, which may give men the appearance of stability or greater 
ability, may have an opposite significance for women. a model that appropriately 
explores these ideas would be interesting.
finally, the study of cohabitation in a panel data sample would be appealing. It would 
be possible to analyze decisions over education, labor force participation, impacts on 
future generations, and to see what happens to individuals’ labor market outcomes 
when their marital status changes. I hope that my work is a useful first-step in this 
area of research.
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